In what follows I present a somewhat selective review of recent work by English-speaking philosophers on the subject of emotion. For a number of reasons, I limit my attention to work p~blished in the past thirty years. For one thing, even a selective review of any longer period would be impossible in the space available to us here. Secondly, though, and just as importantly, I think it would be correct to say that the year 1957 actually represents a rather important point of departure for recent writers. For it was then that there appeared a paper on which nearly everyone currently writing on this subject has found it necessary to comment (Bedford 1957).
In what follows I present a somewhat selective review of recent work by English-speaking philosophers on the subject of emotion. For a number of reasons, I limit my attention to work p~blished in the past thirty years. For one thing, even a selective review of any longer period would be impossible in the space available to us here. Secondly, though, and just as importantly, I think it would be correct to say that the year 1957 actually represents a rather important point of departure for recent writers. For it was then that there appeared a paper on which nearly everyone currently writing on this subject has found it necessary to comment (Bedford 1957) .
Of course, ~irtually every Anglo-American philosopher currently writing about the emotions also acknowledges, in one way or another, the work of Ryle and the later Wittgenstein {Ryle 1949; Wittgenstein 1953) . However, these latter 0 re more appropriately seen as the leading lights of an earlier -and quite crucial -generation, it seems to me, than as members of the group whose writings constitute' the most important recent work in this area. Indeed, both Ryle and Wittgenstein can quite rightly be said to have been the teachers -either literally or effectively -of even the earliest of the writers whose work will be considered here.
The selectivity of the account that follows comes out in a number of other ways as well. For example, an attempt is made to review only the work of English-speaking philosophers. No attempt at all is made to review the work of Anglo-American psychologists, and other social scientists, even in those cases where their work has been of a theoretical or quasi-'philosophical bent.
Another limitation has to do with the type of philosophical work that is reported here. As our comprehensive bibliography will show, philosophers writing in English have, in the period that interests us, attempted to deal with a large number of very different questions. One of these questionsthe one that will exclusively interest us here -is the question of what an emotion ~· However, a great deal of attention has been devoted to other, closely related questions as well: What have the great philosophers of the past had to say about the emotions, for example, and how is this relevant to our present-day philosophical concerns? What can we say about the nature of any particular emotion -anger, say, or fear, or jealousy -and about how this particular emotion differs from all other emotions and hence becomes the emotion that it is? What is the significance of the fact that emotions like fear seem to be able to be generated by fiction, or by films, and hence by the depiction of events that the reader (or viewer) knows do not in fact currently obtain? And, of course, how, if at all, can we relate the realm of the emotional to that of the rational: what is it, for example, for an emotion to be 'irrational' or 'inappropriate', and how can we say, if indeed we can, that a given emotion is irrational (or inappropriate) on a given occasion?
Recent work on these, and on a number of other important questions, will, unfortunately, have to be ignored here. However, as indicated above, a comprehensive bibliography is appended, subdivided where possible into relevant areas of inquiry, so that those interested in recent work in these other areas will know where to begin if they wish to follow up these other concerns.
Finally, we should note what will no doubt become obvious as we proceed: even when we limit ourselves to a review of ~ecent work on the fundamental metaphysical question of what an emotion is, it turns out to be impossible to summarize, in as short a space as this, all the work that one would ideally want to cover in a review of this sort. Hence, one must apologize in advance not only for the general selectivity we have had to impose on ourselves in what follows, but also for the fact that even our remarks about the development of answers to this one central question have had to be so brief and sketchy.
I. The Traditional View and Its Early Critics
Recent work begins and ends, as we shall see, with the evaluation of what has come to be called "the traditional view" of the nature of emotion. Very briefly, this is the view of Descartes, and also, I think, of Hume and William James, according to which an emotion is a mental event of a very special sort: an experienced quality of consciousness that is directly accessible only to the individual experiencing it. On this view, not only is it of the nature of emotion to be both mental and private; it is also the case that distinctions between the various emotions are to be made out entirely in terms of differences in how each emotion feels to the per son experiencing it. (For useful characterizations of the traditional view, see especially Bedford 1957; Alston 1967; and Lyons 1980.) This view had, of course, been subjected to intense criticism by both Wittgenstein and Ryle in the course of their more general remarks on traditional theories of mind. (See especially Ryle 1949, and Wittgenstein 1953) In 1957, however, E. Bedford made it the object of a special attack in the course of a paper devoted exclusively to the analysis of the nature of emotion and to "the function of statements about the emotions and the criteria for their validity" (Bedford 1957 ). Basically, Bedford was concerned to show that the occurrence of the relevant sorts of feelings is not necessary for the correct attribution of emotions to ourselves and others, and to show as well that the differences between the various distinct emotions could not possibly be made out on the basis of felt differences in their phenomenological quality. In addition, Bedford stressed what was to become a common argument in this early part of the period that interests us: namely, that when we attend to how it is we learn the proper use of the various emotion-words, we find that our attention is drawn not to alleged inner experiences, but to what is common, circumstantially and behaviorally, to typical attributions of the relevant terms.
Bedford's paper ·was followed by Kenny's extremely important book, Action, Emotion, and Will , in which a similar line of argument is pursued. Kenny, however, spends a great deal more time attempting to trace the origins of the traditional view, both in the classic philosophers and in the nineteenth-and twentieth-century literature of the experimental psychologists. Kenny's principal criticism of the traditional view, once ·his historical review is completed, involves an attempt to interpret some. of Wittgenstein's remarks about the alleged impossibility of a "private language" and to apply these remarks in an attack on the traditional view. In essence, Kenny argues that emotions as traditionally conceived would be instances of what Wittgenstein would have called "non-things": purely private entities which are not only not accessible to anyone other than the individual who is currently experiencing them, but which, at least as presented in the traditional view, could not even· be coherently identified and reidentified (over time) by the person himself.
The period of early critiques of the traditional view is capped, I believe, by Pitcher's well-known paper "Emotion" (Pitcher 1965 ). Here we find two extremely important criticisms of the traditional view, the first of which is also a major point of Kenny's. Emotions are typically directed towards something (or someone), Pitcher observes -"a person is afraid of Smith", for example, or "is afraid that (something) will fall" -and this is a feature of emotions that cannot possibly be accounted for, he argues, by the traditional view. (After all, how could a mere feeling have this 'directedness' or 'intentionality' that is characteristic of emotional states?) This issue, as we shall see, will become one of the focal points of subsequent theorizing about the nature of emotion. Secondly, though, Pitcher notes that we often evaluate emotions, indicating when we think an emotion is unreasonable or unwarranted, and this too, he argues, is something that cannot possibly be accounted for by the traditional view. (What could it mean, for example, to say of a mere feeling that it was 'irrational' or 'unfounded'?) Pitcher then concludes by arguing that if he is to account for both the 'directedness' and the susceptibility to rational appraisal that is in fact characteristic of the emotions, the proponent of the traditional view will, like Hume, have to introduce certain beliefs as somehow importantly connected with each emotion. In doing this, however, the traditionalist will either implicitly give up the traditional view, as a result of having made the relevant beliefs too important for the presence of emotion, or else leave himself in a position where he has still not explained how emotions can be 'directed' -i.e., how they can have intentional objects -and how they can be rationally appraised.
In summory, then, we can attribute at least the following objections to the early critics of the traditional view: (i) we often attribute emotions to others even though we do not believe they are experiencing any particular 'inner feelings'; (ii) even when such feelings accompany our emotions, it would be implausible to suppose that a given emotion gets its particular character, and hence is distinguishable from other emotions, by reference to exactly what it feels like to experience that emotion; (iii) the teaching and learning of emotion-words occurs not by reference to supposed inner feelings but by reference to such variables as circumstance, likely behavior, beliefs and desires, and so forth; (iv) our emotions are typically object-directed (where "object" is to be taken very broadly -e.g., to include persons), whereas pure feelings are not; and (v) emotions can be evaluated, normatively, as either rational or irrational, appropriate or inappropriate, and so on, whereas feelings cannot, in and of themselves, be so evaluated. As we shall see, it is not until the very end of the period that interests us that these objections are themselves rejected. Instead, the dialectic of the debate that now concerns us is such that most writers simply assume that most of these objections are well-taken, and hence that the traditional view is false, the critical task being that of attempting to determine what an emotion has to be said to be if these objections are to be avoided. (For a useful summary of the work of this period, with the suggestion of a substantive alternative view that we shall discuss below, seeAlston 1967.)
Early Alternatives to the Traditional View
A natural alternative to the traditional view would be some form of philosophical behoviorism: specifically, a behoviorist theory of emotion. And, of course, such a view was in fact suggested by Ryle in The Concept of Mind (Ryle 1949) . One of the most striking things about the period that concerns us here, however, is the absence of any serious con si deration, .PE£ or con, of a strictly behoviorist view. Instead, we find, both in Bedford and in Pitcher, a view that has obvious affinities with Ryle's behoviorism, but that is presented by them os a quite distinct alternative. This first major alternative to the traditional view is what I shall call "the pure-evaluation view" or "P.E.V.". According to this view, emotions ore not experiential states at all, nor ore the latter importantly relevant for the proper attribution of emotion. Rather, to attribute on emotion to someone is to attribute to him a certain evaluative view, according to P. E. V .. It is, that is to soy, to suggest that he is committed to a certain evaluative judgment.
I shall attempt a somewhat more elaborate statement of this view in a moment. First, though, it might be helpful if we illustrated it with on example. Consider, then, a situation where we would be inclined to soy of another that he is afraid. What, really, ore we suggesting when we soy this about him? According to the traditional view, of course, we ore suggesting that he is feeling something: namely, the phenomenologicol 'affect' that is the feeling of fear. On the present view, however, we ore doing no such thing. Rather, we ore pointing to the fact that the per son in question is of the opinion that something in his environment is likely to do him harm. We ore suggesting, that is to soy, that he has oprroised or evaluated his environment os in some respect threatening to him.
It will be clear, in light of this example, how the pure-evaluation view is to be understood: emotions ore 'related' to evaluative judgments, on this view, by virtue of the fact that judgments on this view. Consider, they ore equivalent to evaluative in this regard, the statement of the most prolific recent defender of the view in question:
"What is on emotion? An emotion is a judgment (or a set of judgments) ••• This is why our emotions ore so dependent upon our opinions and "beliefs. A change in my beliefs (for example, the refutation of my belief that John stole my cor) entails (not causes) a change in my emotion (my being angry that John stole my cor). I cannot be angry if I do not believe that someone has wronged or offended me .... My anger ~ that set of judgments. Similarly, my embor ros sment ~ my judgment to the effect that I am in on extremely awkward situation. My shame~ my judgment to the effect that I am responsible for on u ntoword situation or incident." Now it will perhaps be obvious -and here we begin the critiq'ue of P.E.V. -that even if the remarks just quoted are right, and one cannot be angry if one does not believe that someone has wronged or offended one, it does not follow that one's anger just_!_ §_ the belief or judgment that one has been-wronged. Indeed, it seems easy to imagine two related but quite different cases, in each of which we imagine someone who believes that he has been wronged by another but in only one of which do we imagine the former's being angry at the latter for having done him wrong. But, then, if this is imaginable, it seems clear, that _to be angry with another is not simply to believe that he has done one wrong.
Proponents of different versions of P.E.V. might reply, of course, that Solomon has simply chosen the wrong evaluative judgment with which to illustrate his claim that to be angry is just to hold a certain evaluative view. However, it would seem that a more systematic critique of P.E.V. is available. To see this, we must begin by noting an important distinction: namely, the distinction between emotions as long-term conditions or dispositions and emotions as contemporary occurrent states. No doubt, I might be said to have been fearful of being attacked in some way for many years. And this mi-ght plausibly be said of me even if I had seldom actually felt fearful during that period. However, we also sometimes refer to someone as currently feeling afraid (or angry or indignant or whatever). And when we do this, it seems that we are indeed supposing that the relevant party is actually feeling something and, moreover, that what he is feeling is essential to its being the case that he is experiencing the emotion that he is allegedly experiencing (Perkins 1966; Leighton 1985) .
Stated in this way, of course, the prl;lceding objection to P.E.V. sounds rather dogmatic. For it seems simply to assert what the .advocate of P. E. V." denies: namely, that affective states of some sort -bare feelings -are indeed essential if it is to be correctly said of someone that she is experiencing a giyen emotion at a given time. This assertion, however, can be defended-or so, at any rate, the critics of P.E.V. would say -by appeal to ordinary experience. For we would not say that someone is occurrently ~ -or fearful, or whatever -if i.t were not the case that she was feeling something in addition to whatever it was that she was thinking, doing, or believing, such that we were thereby inclined to say that she was. just then (occurrently) angry. This objection to P.E.V. depends crucially, of course, on the distinction between emotions as long-term dispositions or conditions, on the one hand, and emotions as contemporary occurrent states, on the other. Suppose, though, we accept this distinction, as in fact nearly all of the writers that interest us have done. It might then appear that at this point the central question we have to face is the following: is it indeed the case that occurrent emotions always involve 'inner feelings' or 'affect' of some sort, or can a person sometimes be said to be currently experiencing a given emotion even though she is not currently experiencing any 'affect' at all?
Oddly enough, however, this is not a question that has attracted a great deal of interest. On the contrary; recent, writers have tended to reject this question, it seems to me, as being misconceived, rather than to attempt to answer it. What's more, they have tended to reject it, I believe, because they have been inclined to assume that our concept of an occurrent emotion is indeed such as to require the notion of "affect" or "feeling" of some sort -at least for paradigmatic applications of the relevant emotion-terms -while at the same time conceding that that concept is loose enough to allow for possible instances where an occurrent emotion is properly attributed even though the person to whom it is attributed is assumed not to be currently experiencing affect of the relevant sort. They have been inclined to suppose, that is to say, that while our concept of occurrent emotion would not be what it is if we did not suppose that occurrent emotions typically involve affect or feeling, it is nonetheless quite consistent with this to suppose as well that one can 'properly be said to be experiencing a given emotion on a certain occasion even if one is not then experiencing any unusual degree of 'affect' or 'feeling' whatsoever.
In any case, and whatever their reasons, I think it is clear that in the period with which we are concerned, English-speaking writers on the emotions have proceeded on the assumption that, in general, occurrent emotion does indeed require the presence of affect or physiological and psychological disturbances of some sort. 2 One would not be said to be discussing the concept of occurrent anger, for example, at least as far as the debate that interests us is concerned, unless one were talking, among other things, ,about the condition a person is in when he is agitated in some way by something that he believes to have occurred in his environment. The question has been not whether this is somehow so, but, rather, exactly what else must be present, over and above the relevant state of agitation, if a person is properly to be said to be angry, fearful, jealous, joyous, etc •• We are left, then, in the following position. We have rejected the traditional view of emotion because it seems that mere feelings are not enough to account for what we actually take an occurrent emotion to be. At the same time, we have also rejected the pure-evaluation view, on the grounds that while feelings alone are not sufficient to account for what we mean by an (occurrent) emotional state, their presence is in fact necessary if a given state is to count as an instance of some emotion -anger, say, or fear, or whatever. (The point, of course, is not that we are pr.e~ supposing that one could never be angry, or fearful, or whatever, if one were not at the same time feeling something, but that in general what we mean by anger, fear, etc., is, inter alia, a state of agitation of' some sort.) Thus, what we must go on to do is to say what is necessary, in addition to the relevant sorts of feelings, for the presence of an emotion. And this, of course, is exactly the direction that the debate that interests us has taken: having rejected both the traditional view and its early (pure-evaluation) alternatives, recent theorist~ have felt compelled to go on to say what they think needs to be added -to the relevant state of agitation -if we are to have adequately explained what an emotion is.
Ill. The Causal View
The most popular answer to this question -I mean to the question of what we need to add to the 'feeling' or 'affective' component of emotion if we are to have said what an emotion is -is provided by what we may call "the causal view". 3 In an early -and still quite popular -formulation, this view was a natural outgrowth of P. E. V.. For in this early formulation, which I shall call "the causal-evaluation view," or "C.E.V.", the causal view holds that an emotion is simply a feeling or bodily sensation that has been caused by a certain evaluation. More specifically, it is the view that any given emotion can be characterized as a state of physiological or psychological agitation that has been caused by an evaluation that is peculiarly associated with the emotion in question. Thus, anger is the emotion that is present when such agitation results from the judgment that one has been wronged, fear is the emotion that is present when such agitation results from the judgment that one is in danger, and so on for each and every emotion: a given evaluation is made, a certain bodily state ensues (generally, along with awareness, on the part of the person in question, of the presence of that bodily state), and the presence of that state is said to put the relevant individual in the relevant emotional state just insofar as the relevant judgment has been made and has caused the bodily state in question. (See especially Alston 1967; and Lyons 1974 and I say that this view is a natural outgrowth of P.E.V., of course, because it retains the latter's insistence that an evaluation is essential for emotion, adding only the (admittedly quite important) claim that the evaluation in question does not constitute the relevant emotional state but, rather, leads to the bodily state that, given its etiology, can be said to constitute the emotion. Notice, though, that C.E. V. claims not that the bodily state~ the emotion, simpliciter, but that the bodily state is the emotion insofar as it is a bodily state that was caused by the relevant evaluation. Consider in this connection the analogous case of certain bodily injuries, such as burns: a given bodily condition counts as a burn just in case it happens to have been caused in a certain way . Similarly for 'scar' (Shaffer 1983) , '.print' (in the craft or artistic sense of the term) , and so on: certain things are what they are, only if they have come to be the way they are in a c.ertain way -i.e., only if they have a certain causal history. (For the best general discussion, see especially also Thalberg 1978.) Despite the fact that it seems to constitute an improvement over P. E. V., however, at least for those who believe that affect or feeling is essential for emotion, there is an obvious difficulty with C.E.V.: there appear to be emotions that do not in fact have to have been caused by evaluative judgments of the relevant sort in order to be the emotions that they are. A clear example, it seems to me, is jealousy. On one quite plausible analysis, to be jealous is to be agitated as a result of the fact that one believes (or at least suspects or fears) that someone by whom one wishes to be favored in some way in fact favors someone else in that way instead (Farrell 1980 ). Here we seem to have a feeling -i.e., a 'sensed' or perceived state of bodily agitation -that is caused not by an evaluation, but by the combination of a belief and a desire (namely, the desire to be favored in some way and the belief that one is not in fact so favored). And thus here we seem to have a counterexample to the view that is suggested by C.E. V ..
We can get around this difficulty, however, by generalizing the causal view in an obvious way: following any number of recent writers, we might say that a state of bodily upset counts as a given emotional state just in case it has been caused either by an evaluative judgment or by a belief or a desire (or by some combination of beliefs, evaluative judgments and desires) (see especially Green 1972; Neu 1977; and Farrell 1980) . No doubt, certain emotions will be the particular emotions that they are only if they are bodily states that have been caused, specifically, by some particular belief,· desire, or evaluative judgment. Hence, it is not to be thought that on this generalized causal view, various particular emotions can be caused or brought about in any way whatever. Still, the general idea behind this view should be clear enough: what is essential for emotion is both a bodily upset of some sort and a causal history of some sort -specifically, a history in which, depending upon what emotion· is in question, the relevant bodily state has been brought about by some belief, desire or evaluative judgment (or by some combination of these elements operating together or in some specific eau sal chain).
This generalized causal view, or "G.C.V." as I shall call it, currently enjoys a great deal of support (see references just mentioned, as well as many of the references in Section I of our general bibliography below}. And in fact it is a very attractive view, apparently explaining precisely what was lacking in each of the competing alternatives described above. Despite its attractions, however, there are problems with this view as well. For one thing, there appear to be cases where emotion does not have to have a causal history anything like that which is required by this new view -i.e., where a state of bodily upset counts as an emotional state even though that state has been caused neither by an antecedent belief nor by an antecedent desire nor by an antecedent evaluation nor by any combination of these standard factors. A good example, of course, is the case of sudden fright. Someone might be shocked into an intense state of fright simply as a result of having been suddenly surprised as they were walking along a dark street. And they might be so shocked even if they had not had time, upon being surprised; to form the least idea that they were in danger, the least desire to avoid what was confronting them, and so on. Thus, there appears to be at least one counterexample to G.C. V .'s implied claim to have explained what it is that is required .if a given state of bodily upset is to count as an emotional state of the sort that interests us here.
It might be thought that this particular difficulty could be gotten round by generalizing G.C. V. even further, so that it holds that an emotion is a state of bodily upset that has been caused either by any one of the sorts of states mentioned above ~ by some other state, such as that which we imagined bringing about the relevant bodily state in the emotional state of sudden fright just described. However, aside from the fact that it is both ad hoc and uninformative, I think it is clear that this reply is insufficient to save G. C. V. from another, even graver difficulty. To see this, imagine a case where a given bodily state has been caused by some evaluative or factual judgment, perhaps in conjunction with the presence of some desire, and hence where, in accordance with G. C. V., we have the presence of a certain emotion. (For purposes of discussion, let us ·suppose that it is the emotion of fear, the relevant state of bodily agitation having been brought about by thoughts and desires of the appropriate sort.) But now suppose that in just such a case, the subject of this emotion makes a belief-change of the sort that would incline us -and him -to say that while he was feeling the relevant emotion, up until the time he adopted the new belief, he is now no longer .feeling that emotion {in light of his change of belief). (Suppose, for example, that his fear was fear for the loss of his child, but that he is now no longer afraid of this eventuality, having had the child restored to him safe and sound.) In such a case, it would seem that G.C. V. must hold that the subject in question is still experiencing the relevant emotion, provided that he is still experiencing the relevant affect or bodily agitation, even though, given his change in belief, neither we nor the subject would be at all inclined to say that he is still experiencing the emotion. And it seems that G.C.V. must have this result because in this situation we have a case of bodily agitation {or 'inner affect') produced by precisely the sorts· of states that require us to say, if we accept G.C.V., that the party is experiencing the relevant emotional state (Thalberg 1973 and Aquila 1975 ).
The defender of G.C.V. could avoid the difficulty created by cases of this sort, of course, by adding to the characterization of his view the proviso that the relevant bodily state is the relevant emotional state, given the appropriate causal background, only as long as none of the beliefs that were involved in that eau sal background have subsequently changed. Aside from being blatantly ad hoc, however, and entirely uninformative, this modification of G.C.V. changes that view in a very significant way; For what it tells us is that emotions cannot, after all, be characterized simply as states of bodily agitation that have a certain causal history. Rather, as the considerations just adumbrated quite clearly show, we are now at the point where we must begin to think of some emotions, at any rate, as in~ volving a cognitive element not just in their etiology, but in some more essential way -e.g., as involving thoughts that are concomitant with the relevant bodily state, and that are essential to that state's constituting the emotion it is ordinarily said to constitute, even when a causal history of the relevant sort is assumed to have occurred.
IV. The Cognitive-Constituents View
As we have just seen, the considerations sketched above suggest that, at least for many emotions, we need to postulate a cognitive element not just in the causal background of the relevant bodily state, but also in, or at least concomitant with, the bodily state itself. This, of course, is because, as we have seen, for many emotions we would be inclined to withdraw the attribution of that emotion upon discovering that the relevant cognition (or belief) is not present. Let us call the type of view that these considerations suggest "the cognitive-constituents view", or "C.C. V.", and let us define this type of view, very roughly for now, as follows: let us say that on such a view, a bodily state of the relevant sort will count as an emotion only if, inter alia, that state is accompanied by a certain (kind of) cognition or belief. Obvi9usly, one question such a view raises is the question of just what sorts of beliefs or cognitions are at issue here. Another, more pressing question, though, is this: how must the cognition s or beliefs that are thus required for emotions, according to C.C.V., be related to the relevant bodily (or affective) state 4 if the latter is to count as an emotion in the sense that interests us here? Is it enough, for example, that one has the relevant feeling and the relevant belief at the same time? Or must they be related in some special way, questions of etiolog y to one side, if their concomitance is to count as an emotional state of the sort that currently interests us?
One answer is that it is enough that they occur at the same time, provided, at any rate, that we also assume that the current cognition was also part of what brought the relevant bodily state about ( Thalberg 1973) . 5
Thus, if my belief that my child is missing is (port of) what has brought my state of og.itation about, and if I still believe that he is missing, then my state con quite properly be soid to be one of fear or anxiety, regardless of exactly how the relevant belief happens to be currently reloted to my feelings of agitation. After all, su.ch a case is. a paradigm of what it is to be on xious or afraid:. l come to believe that something. hozardou s threatens me, this causes me to be agitated, and I· continue to believe, at least for the time being, that I am indeed threatened in the relevant way.
Unfortu note! y, it is not clear that this very simple (and very op pealing) view will do. To see this, imagine the following rother odd but nonetheless very instructive possibility {developed from Aq uilo 1975). Suppose that I hove become quite og.itoted because l believe I have misplaced some important document -my passport, soy. Typically, no doubt, it will be correct to soy, at least so long os I remain ogitoted ond continue to believe that my passport is missing, that l am anxious or worried about the fact that I cannot find my passport {see, for example, Tholberg 1973). Suppose, though, that while my agitation has indeed been brought about by my belief that I hove lost my passport, for some reos.on it subsequently ceases to be directed towards the fact that l believe thot this is so. Suppose, for example, that having been bro.ught about by the thought of the missing passport, my agitation groduolly finds some other belief on which to focus -e.g., my increasing forgetfulness and the implications of this for the possibility that I am becoming senile. In such a case it would seem unreasonable to soy that what I am anxious about is the fact that I believe I hove misplaced my passport, and it would seem unreasonable to soy this despite the foct that my beli"ef about the missing po.ssport is os s umed both to hove eau sed my agitation ond to hove remained intact so that it is also concomitant with that agitation. And what this means, of course, is that the simple version of C. C. V. described obove must be false: we cannot show that some state of bodily agitation is a certain emotional state, ~' simply by showing that that state was caused by the rel.evant sort of belief and is at the some time currently accompanied by that belief. For in the case described above, these conditions ore met, and yet we would not soy that the resulting emotional state is the state ordinarily associated with the relevant belief (Aquilo 1975) .
What these reflections suggest, of course, is that the cognition that C.C.V. requires. if a given bodily state is to count· os on emotional state must be a cognition that is not only concomitant with that bodily state but also somehow ~ of that state, or otherwise intimately connected with it, in such a way os to ensure that the joint presence of cognition and affect does indeed ensure the presence of the relevant emotional state. Cognition on d affect must be so related, that is to soy, os to make it impossible for the cognition to become 'detached' from the affect, though still contemporaneous with it, in the way that is illu stroted by our imoginar y case above. And the problem, of course, is in saying just what this special relation is . 6
Unfortunately, we do not have space to attempt to summarize here even the most prominent recent attempt to explain now this relation is best conceived (Aquila 1975) . Suffice it to say that the problem of explaining the nature of this relation is octually just an aspect of the more general problem of saying what it is for a feeling, or anything else, to be a feeling of or about something (or someone). It is, that is to say, just an aspect of the more general problem of making sense of the notion of intentionality and how it is p'Ossible for, say, a mental state to he directed towards (or focused on) some object or some proposition or some state of affairs.
V. The Noncognitivist View
We have been assuming that, for some emotions at any rate, a state of bodily agitation must be accompanied by a contemporaneous thought or belief of some sort, if that state is to be able to count as an occurrent emotional state of the sort that interests us. (This, of course, was because in ou-r discussion of the so-called generalized causal view, it emerged that in the absence of such a contemporaneous cognition, we would, in many cases, be inclined to withdraw the attribution of the relevant emotion and to do so even if the relevant bodily state had been brought about in the relevant way.) Needless to say, however, this assumption has been challenged by a number of recent writers (see especially Greenspan 1980 , and Kraut 1986a and 1986b . Consider, in order to see the prima facie plausibility of this challenge, the following sort of case (Green span 1981) . Suppose that I have had a number of rather bad encou·nters with vicious dogs and that as result of these encounters I have developed a very deep-seated and entirely undiscriminating fear of dogs. It is not that I am no longer able to distiniguish between a dog that is likely to attack and one that is not, let us supposej it is just that I have developed a fear of dogs as such: when I am near one, harmless or not, I experience, uncontrollably, the unmistakable signs of terrible fear. Suppose, further, that on a certain occasion I am in the presence of a particularly friendly dog -one that is well-known to me and, indeed, one that is not only quite friendly but also quite aged and practically to.othless as well. Given my experiences and the phobia that I have developed as a result of those experiences, it is quite possible that I will exhibit all the symptoms of fear when I am in this dog's presence -let us coil him "Fido" -even though I do not believe for a moment that he is likely to attack me. (As proof of this latter claim, let us suppose as well that I am not at all inclined to warn others, including my own children, to stay away from Fido.) Would we not say in such a case that I am afraid of Fido, despite the fact that I do not believe that he constitutes a threat to me? And does not the fact that this is so show that occurrent fear does not in fact require a contemporaneous cognitio~ -specifically, the thought that I am in danger -of the sort suggested above?
It might be objected that my fear in such a case, if fear it is, would be entirely irrational. Suppose this is correct. Does it follow that this sort of case does not present a problem for the varieties of cognitive theories discussed above? It seems to me that it does not. For the claim there was. that in the relevant sorts of cases, we would not have the relevant emotion if we did not have, contemporaneous with the requisite ·agitation, a belief of a certain sort. The claim was not that we could not rationally have the relevant emotion in the absence of the relevant cognition, but that we could not have the emotion. And what we have in the case just described is a case where it does seem possible to have the relevant emotion, given the relevant agitation, even though by hypothesis we do not have the presence of the relevant cognitive state.
The 'cognitivists' could rightly observe, of course, that their claim is not tl}at we must always have cognition conjoined to agitation in order to have emotion, but that we sometimes have to have cognition and agitation so conjoined if we are also to have emotion. And this is important, since all the Fido case shows is that it is possible to have one kind of emotionnamely, fear -without having the kind of cognition that is typically associated with that particular emotion (namely, the thought that one is faced with danger of some sort). There are two complications that are nonetheless y.torth noting here, however, even if we accept this observation and so conclude that sometimes cognitions of the relevant sort will be necessary and sometimes they will not. First, it is surprising that the case we have described is a case of fear (and not an altogether unlikely case at that). For fear is precisely one of the emotions where the cognitivist claim -namely, that for certain emotions cognitions must be present if agitation is to count as emotion -seems most plausible. Indeed, the cognitivist position is almost invariably made out with examPles of just one of two kinds: anger and fear. Secondly, though, and far more importantly, we must note that if the implications of the Fido case are indeed such as we are currently assuming them to be, it follows that the task of explaining how it is that emotions get their 'directedness', or 'intentionality', is even more onerous than we have so far taken it to be. For in our discussion of the second version of the so-called "cognitive-constituents" view, we implicitly assumed that this directedness or intentionality would ultimately be made out in terms of the directedness or intentionality of the thoughts or cognitions that necessarily accompany the relevant bodily states. If the lesson we have drawn from the Fido case is right, however, and there can indeed be states of agitation that are directed in the rele-vent way but that are not so directed by virtue of being accompanied by the relevant sorts of thoughts, then the task of explaining how this directedness or intentionality is possible is even more daunting than we may initially have thought.
For it now appears that we must show not only how thoughts cari have intentional objects but also how it is that perceived states of bodily agitation can have objects as well. 7 VI. Concluding Remorks I said at the outset of these remarks that recent work on the nature of emotion begins and ends with consideration of what we have called "the traditional view" of what an emotion is. I can now explain the sense in which this is so. Obviously, the very complex views to which the most recent of our recent writers have been led are not at all the same as the view we had in mind in describing the so-called traditional view. For these most recent views make central to the possibility of emotion the possibility of the phenomenon that we have here called "directedness" or "intentionality". Nonetheless, it should be obvious why I wish to suggest that the most recent writers -Aquila, for example, Greenspan, and Kraut -have in a sense been forced to return to a kind of reconsideration of the traditional view. For what these writers have implicitly been doing, it seems to me, is returning to the notion that there .is no avoiding the centrality of affect (or bodily agitation) if we are to understand what it is to undergo an occurrent emotional state. The necessity to deal with this (affective) aspect of emotional experience is already present, of course, in the early rejection of the purely evaluative views (Section Ill above). However, the hope there was that it would be possible to incorporate the affective element into a comprehensive theory of emotion without at the same time paying it a great deal of attention. And what the more recent cognitive and noncognitive work suggests (Sections IV and V above) is that this is a hope that is not likely to be re.alized.
Notes
A similar analysis would of course be suggested for other emotions and also for attributions of emotion to oneself. Thus, if I conclude that another person is angry with me, what I am concluding is that he has come to believe that I have done him wrong. Similarly, when I conclude that I myself am angry with another, what has happened is not . that I have come to see that I am currently feeling something -namely, the specific inner feeling that is the alleged feeling of anger'; rather, what has happened is that I have come to see that I believe the per son in question has done me wrong.
2 I should note that here an ambiguity enters our account, which we shall not be entirely rid of even after our more extended remarks below. For most writers, what is alle'9edly presupposed by the concept of an occurrent emotion is "affect" or "'feeling" as we have been thinking of it so far. For others, though, what is presupposed is either affect (or feeling) of this sort or some sort of (possibly .unperce.ived) physiological and/or psychological agitation. Henceforth, when I allude to what is generally thought to be presupposed by the concept of occurrent emotion, I should be taken to be referring to something which would be exemplified by the presence of either of these sorts of items, .even if my actual terminology seems to suggest one rather than the other.
3
More precisely, this answer is provided by each of a variety of views, all of which may properly be called "causal" views. But more on this below.
4 See note 2 above for an explanation of why we must equivocate here between saying that the relevant state is .a "bodily" state and saying that it is an "affective" state. In the normal course of events, of course, this distinction will be of no consequence, since the subject's awareness of the relevant bodily changes will be precisely what we are referring to when we refer to the "affective" or "feeling" side of the emotional expe.rience.
5
I should note that in attributing this view to Thalberg, I am, for the sake of brevity, rather misrepresenting his actual views. For while he holds that it is enough, for the presence of emotion, for the cognition and the affect to exist at the same time, Thalberg does not in fact embrace the eau sal view. On the contrary; he holds that the latter is incc>nsistent with C. C. V., properly understood. On this last point, however, I believe that Thalberg is mistaken, as I think Aquila clearly shows (Aquila 1975 
